conceptual

Plato on False Judgment in the  Theaetetus Axel Barceló-Aspeitia  ,  Edgar González-Varela Journal of the History of Philosophy Johns Hopkins University Press Volume 61, Number 3, July 2023 pp. 349-372 10.1353/hph.2023.a902875 Abstract Under what conditions would it be paradoxical to consider the possibility of false judgment? Here we claim that in the initial puzzle of  Theaetetus  187e5–188c9, where Plato investigates the question of what could psychologically cause a false judgment, the paradoxical nature of this question derives from certain constraints and restrictions about causal explanation, in particular, from the metaphysical principle that opposites cannot cause opposites. Contrary to all previous interpretations, this metaphysical approach does not attribute to Plato any controversial epistemological assumptions and fits better with the text and its role within the dialectic of the dialogue.