What makes logical necessities true?

For example:
  1. A. Jonah Hill is alive or he is not.
What makes A true?
As far I can tell, there are four kinds of proposals:
  1. 1. Contingentism: A is true because Jonah Hill is alive (or because of whatever makes Jonah be alive).
  2. 2. Essentialism: A is true in virtue of disjunction and negation having the logical nature they have.
  3. 3. Representationalism: A is true because the actual world is a possible world.
Pros and Cons:
  1. 4. Contingentism: A is true because Jonah Hill is alive (or because of whatever makes Jonah be alive).
    1. a. PROS: 
      1. i. Does not require postulating special entities like worlds and logical operations.
      2. ii. Offers a uniform account of the way operations affect truthmaking for contingent and necessary truths, i.e., it respects the following truth-making principle: truth-bearers of the form PvQ are made true by what makes P true (if P is true) plus what makes Q true (if it is true).
    2. b. CONS: 
      1. i. Makes necessary truths less metaphysically fundamental than contingent facts.
      2. ii. Truth-making without metaphysical dependency: A is true, regardless of whatever makes A true exists or not.
      3. iii. If truth-making maximalism is false for contingent truths, a lot, but not all necessary truths would lack truth-maker as well.
      1. 5. Essentialism: A is true in virtue of disjunction and negation having the logical nature they have. 
    1. c. PROS: 
      1. i. Seems to fit well with essentialist accounts of other kinds of necessary truths.
      2. ii. Respect metaphysical dependence: if logical operators were of a  different nature, the logical truths would be other.
    2. d. CONS: 
      1. i. Under the very plausible assumption that essences are like definitions, the claim that all logical truths are true in virtue of the essences of logical operations is equivalent to the controversial claim that all logical truths are provable.
      2. ii. Lacks a uniform account of the way operations affect truth-making for contingent and necessary truths, i.e., it violates the following truth-making principle: truth-bearers of the form PvQ are made true by what makes P true (if P is true) plus what makes Q true (if it is true).
      3. iii. Furthermore, if A is made true at least partially in virtue of the essence of disjunction, why isn´t this true of every disjunction as well? Also, if this were true, then most complex properties would be extrinsic. For example, an electron would have the property of being an electron or a proton extrinsically. 
      4. 2. Representationalism: A is true because the actual world is a possible world.
    3. a. PROS: 
      1. i. Seems to fit well with the prevailing representationalist attitude of classical logicians, i.e., that there is something about the nature of possible worlds that make certain truths –logical truths–, true in all of them.
      2. ii. Respects metaphysical dependence: logical truths are not true in all not-possible worlds.
    4. b. CONS: 
      1. i. Would make all logical truths be made true by the very same truth-maker.
      2. ii. Lacks a uniform account of the way operations affect truth-making for contingent and necessary truths, i.e., it violates the following truth-making principle: truth-bearers of the form PvQ are made true by what makes P true (if P is true) plus what makes Q true (if it is true).


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