Whataboutisms as a Philosophical Problem
Why has it been difficult to offer satisfactory account of fallacious whataboutisms? Act 1. A accuses B for doing bad thing X. Act 2. B argues that A is being a hypocrite. She gives evidence that A does not actually care about X – for example, because A does X (or something sufficiently similar) herself or because she has remained silent when, knowingly to her, others have patently also done X (or something sufficiently similar) – and thus asks A to recognize that she is using X just to get at her for other reasons that have nothing to do with X. Act 3. A argues that B is trying to change the topic from her doing X by introducing other irrelevant cases of X, when the issue is if B has done X and not whether someone else, even A herself, have also done X or anything similar. Since B cannot give us reasons to doubt that she has actually done X nor that X is a bad thing, she is trying to distract us from this point and thus derail the discussion. Who, if anyone, is right and ...