On Elizabeth Barnes and J. Robert G. Williams’ theory of metaphysical indeterminacy
I. What is metaphysical indeterminacy according to Barnes and Williams? p is undetermined if and only if, settled all the relevant semantic and epistemological issues, “it’s simply unsettled whether p or rather ¬p obtains”, i.e., “…there is a precise way that things are [but it is] primitively indeterminate which precise way things are…” Is it circular? Well, yes not viciously so, because Indeterminacy is a metaphysical primitive. That P is indeterminate does not mean that (but entails that) it is impossible to know whether P (that is epistemic indeterminacy) it is possible that P and it is also possible that not P (that is contingency) It also does not mean (and it does not entail either): it is neither true that P nor is it false (thus bivalence is false) it is neither true that P nor is it true that ~P (thus ( P v ~P ) is not a tautology) How is that possible? How I like to understand indeterminacy: The world is indeterminate if an only if there are fundamental existential tru...