conceptual

  It is misleading to say that the aim of Frankfurt (1969) is to disprove the principle of alternate possibilities when he explicitly says that he is defending a revised version of the principle, according to which   “…a person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it because he could not have done otherwise…” (Frankfurt 1969: 838) He does say that “the principle of alternate possibilities is false” and argues against the claim that “… a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise…” which he calls the ( traditional ?)   principle of alternate possibilities (Frankfurt 1969: 829) But he does defend the view that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he has not done it because he could not have done otherwise, which is also a version of the principle of alternate possibilities. He even starts his article by asserting that “…no one … seems inclined to deny or even to question that ...