conceptual

I was invited to talk about my book on luck this week in Sevilla as part of this wonderful workshop. It was a great experience and I am very thankful for the organizers. After hearing and discussing topics related to luck and risk, specially from an epistemological perspective, here are some of my main conclusions: Rejecting a philosophical theory because of a thought experiment that seems to provide counter-examples is not good practice.
 In general, thought experiments ought to be complemented by – turned into, I would say – rigorous theorising, modelling and argumentation. Epistemic risk is not a genuine phenomenon (at least not different from probability or other already well established epistemic notions).
 However, the theoretical tools developed for the study of epistemic risk are still epistemically valuable for other purposes. Except, perhaps, for truth (and very closely related notions), all central epistemic notions are modal. The relevant uncertainty in norma...

I have previously argued that given the strong similarities between moral and epistemic normatively (first explored by me in my 2012 pape r), we must expect to find Gettier cases in the case of moral judgments, i.e., cases where we want to claim that an agent’s actions are morally reprehensible from the internal or intentional perspective, morally reprehensible from the external or consequentialist perspective YET NOT morally reprehensible from a third perspective, different ( ex hypothesis ) from the intrinsic and extrinsic ones. This third perspective, I have argued, is the perspective from the adequate link between intentions (and preparations and similar internal aspects of action) and outcomes (and consequences and similar external aspects of action). So, just as a Gettier case in epistemology is one where one has a justified true belief which is yet not knowledge because justification and truth are not adequately linked, so a moral Gettier case would be one where one has bad i...

Contextualist and relativists regarding epistemic modals quarrel on how to account for phenomena like the following: Sally’s mother comes into Sally’s bedroom to find her looking under the bed. “What is going on?” asks Sally’s mother, “why are you looking under the bed?” (1) “My glasses, they might be there,” replies Sally. After taking a long look under he bed, Sally finds no glasses under it. So she moves on to look in other places, but not before saying, (2) “Oops, I was wrong.” What is going on here? According to me, this is just a case of moral luck, but in the context of assertion. According to Andrew Latus (2001): The problem of moral luck traps us between an intuition and a fact: . 1)  the intuition that luck must not make moral differences (e.g., that luck must not affect a person’s moral worth, that luck must not affect what a person is morally responsible for).  . 2)  the fact [Berg-Cross 1975, Cushman et.al. 2009, Cushman 2008, etc.] tha...