conceptual

One of the basic problem of grounding  theory originates from an assumed fundamental asymmetry between the ultimate explanans and explananda of metaphysical explanation. While explananda can be composed of other facts in several ways, by disjunction, negation, conjunction, quantification, etc., the fundamental facts that constitute the explanans are supposed to be simple in themselves and total explanans can only be composed in of these simple facts in a straightforward aggregative way. In other words, while we need to find a metaphysical explanation to disjunctive, negative, quantified truth-bearers, etc., Neo-Aristotelian metaphysics resists the acceptance of fundamental negative, disjunctive or quantified facts. Thus, it faces the significant challenge of having to find adequate non-disjunctive grounds for disjunctive facts, positive grounds for negative facts, non-quantified grounds for quantified fact, non-modal grounds for modal facts, etc. So far, this task had proved elusiv...