conceptual

It is widely accepted that explanation is a factive relation, that is, that it holds among facts (or true propositions, the distinction is not relevant for our purposes): if A explains B, A and B must be actual facts. Beyond that, it is a huge puzzle to determine what else is required for A to explain B. Some philosophers have defended the view that necessitation is another necessary condition for explanation, that is, that for A to explain B, A must necessitate or metaphysically entail B. The rationale for this condition is simple: for A to explain B, A must tell us why B happened instead of anything else that could have happened. If A does not entail B, then A is consistent with some possible outcome C different from B and this cannot explain why B happened instead of C. I (in Barceló 2015) and others have argued against the necessity condition. An interesting counterexample to the hypothesis that necessitation is required for explanation are what I will call explanations b...

Regarding tools, it is impossible to account for their form without mention of function. Consider a simple tool like a hammer. In order to explain why hammers are the way they are, i It would be impossible to explain why a hammer is shaped as it is, or why it is not fluffier and made of cardboard without mentioning what it is for. Furthermore, it is also impossible to explain why our tools are the way they are independently of how we are ourselves. It makes no sense trying to explain why hammers have the dimensions they have without referring to the size of our arms and hands. Even if aliens developed hammers, it is very unlikely that they would be similar in shape to ours if aliens were not also similar in shape and physiology to us. In general, technology is strongly shaped, among other factors, by constraints on how users are and what they can and cannot do as much as what goals such users wish to achieve through their use of such tools. So far, this must not be controversial. ...