conceptual

Let's call theories of grounding according to which (i) grounding necessitation is false and (ii)   “grounds aren't the only facts that might be difference-makers” (Muñoz 2020)  disjuctivist  theories of grounding. In (2015) I defended a disjunctivist account of truth-making as a defeasible relation and Muñoz (2020) recognizes this work as an antecedent to his own disjunctivism. Another important form of disjunctivism is conditional grounding theories like those of Badder or  Van Oordt Faller. The main difference between conditional theories and accounts like Muñoz or mine is that while   Badder and Van Oordt Faller recognize that besides grounds, there are also enabling conditions, Muñoz and I recognize also/instead disabling or defeating conditions. Disjunctivist accounts have recently been criticized by the likes of  Fatema  Amijee, who writes:   “The best candidate for such a view – and the only one that I am aware of – treats the totality fact as a background condition fo