conceptual

On the ethics of (watching, doing, commercialising, etc.) pornography/adult entertainment, we commonly find six major positions: Three positions on porn itself: Neutral: There is nothing morally wrong with porn itself, but nothing good about it either. Pornography is a semantic category and, as such, it has no moral significance. Positive: Porn itself is morally good. Porn is art (Maes 2011) and art is good. Porn is, at least for the consumer, (safe, consensual, satisfying) sex and (safe, consensual, satisfying) sex is good. Negative: Porn itself is evil. It contributes to the subjugation of women. It debases sex. Positions on porn de facto, i.e., as it actually happens nowadays: Negative: Porn de facto is evil, but it need not be. It contributes to the subjugation of women, but it could not; as a matter of fact, it could be liberating to women. It debases sex, but it could not; as a matter of fact, it could ennoble our sexuality. Positive: Porn de facto is good, but

I have previously argued that given the strong similarities between moral and epistemic normatively (first explored by me in my 2012 pape r), we must expect to find Gettier cases in the case of moral judgments, i.e., cases where we want to claim that an agent’s actions are morally reprehensible from the internal or intentional perspective, morally reprehensible from the external or consequentialist perspective YET NOT morally reprehensible from a third perspective, different ( ex hypothesis ) from the intrinsic and extrinsic ones. This third perspective, I have argued, is the perspective from the adequate link between intentions (and preparations and similar internal aspects of action) and outcomes (and consequences and similar external aspects of action). So, just as a Gettier case in epistemology is one where one has a justified true belief which is yet not knowledge because justification and truth are not adequately linked, so a moral Gettier case would be one where one has bad i