conceptual

Notes on Franz Berto’s first talk of the 2023 Cátedra Gaos Just as to be an intentionalist (like Kripke, but unlike Quine) is to take extentionality to be too coarse as tool for philosophically analyzing some phenomena, to be a hyperintentionalist (like Dunn and Restall, Berto, Chalmers, Yablo, Fine, etc. but unlike Lewis (sometimes), Stalker   (sometimes) , Montague, etc.) is to take intensionality (traditional modality) to be too coarse as tool for philosophically analyzing some phenomena. Intentionality is to material equivalence as hyper-intentionality is to necessary equivalence, but this can be extended ad infinitum, at least in principle, thus: Let R be an equivalence relation on a representational domain D , then H is a hyper-R operator iff not- R(H(p), H(q)) in spite of R(p, q) . In this schema, intentionality is hyper-extensionality, and hyper-intentionality is, well, hyper-intentionality. Thus, there can be hyper-hyper-intentionality and hyper-hyper-hyp...

For example: A. Jonah Hill is alive or he is not. What makes A true? As far I can tell, there are four kinds of proposals: 1. Contingentism: A is true because Jonah Hill is alive (or because of whatever makes Jonah be alive). 2. Essentialism: A is true in virtue of disjunction and negation having the logical nature they have. 3. Representationalism: A is true because the actual world is a possible world. Pros and Cons: 4. Contingentism: A is true because Jonah Hill is alive (or because of whatever makes Jonah be alive). a. PROS:  i. Does not require postulating special entities like worlds and logical operations. ii. Offers a uniform account of the way operations affect truthmaking for contingent and necessary truths, i.e., it respects the following truth-making principle: truth-bearers of the form PvQ are made true by what makes P true (if P is true) plus what makes Q true (if it is true). b. CONS:  i. Makes necessary truths less metaphys...