conceptual

Notes on Franz Berto’s first talk of the 2023 Cátedra Gaos Just as to be an intentionalist (like Kripke, but unlike Quine) is to take extentionality to be too coarse as tool for philosophically analyzing some phenomena, to be a hyperintentionalist (like Dunn and Restall, Berto, Chalmers, Yablo, Fine, etc. but unlike Lewis (sometimes), Stalker   (sometimes) , Montague, etc.) is to take intensionality (traditional modality) to be too coarse as tool for philosophically analyzing some phenomena. Intentionality is to material equivalence as hyper-intentionality is to necessary equivalence, but this can be extended ad infinitum, at least in principle, thus: Let R be an equivalence relation on a representational domain D , then H is a hyper-R operator iff not- R(H(p), H(q)) in spite of R(p, q) . In this schema, intentionality is hyper-extensionality, and hyper-intentionality is, well, hyper-intentionality. Thus, there can be hyper-hyper-intentionality and hyper-hyper-hyper-intentional