conceptual

Reading “On what there is” again in 2026, I am vert surprised about many things about it. Not onyl the tone – even though Alejandro Vazquez del Mercado has reminded me of how much the tone of analytic scholarship has changed in the last century, I was still surprised – but also how good it is!  So many good and deep thoughts! And also how ba d it is, as well!  It is rigurous in following his and his opponents arguments to their consequences, but when it comes to give a final argument against Meinongianism and Platonism, he just shrugs and claims that: “I remain free to maintain that the fact that a given linguistic utterance is meaningful (or significant, as I prefer to say so as not to invite hypostasis of meanings as entities) is an ultimate and irreducible matter of fact; or, I may undertake to analyze it in terms directly of what people do in the presence of the linguistic utterance in question and other utterances similar to it.” And later “The problem of explaining these...

I. Introduction and Preliminary Remarks  This post aims at presenting two essential notions in Wittgenstein’s philosophical account of mathematics duting the middle period of his philosophical carreer: mathematical objects and concepts.  Let me start by making two preliminary remarks: First, to specify to which Frege and which Wittgenstein’s I refer to, and, second, to clarify the scope of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics during this period. First of all, it must be recognized that both Wittgenstein and Frege were thinkers whose philosophical views, specially on mathematics –a central topic for both of them–, radically mutated throughout their philosophical careers. In this paper, I focus on two particular periods of each of these philosopher’s careers. For Frege, I focus on his late XIXth century work, specially on The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884) and contemporary articles. For Wittgenstein, I consider only the work of his middle period, the early th...