Fictional Names as Props
In Yablo’s diagnosis, a seemingly fatal combination for the Millians is the existence of sentences where empty-names, occur in standard use , and express evaluable propositions , especially true propositions . The most recalcitrant candidates for such a kind of sentences are negative existentials like “Sherlock Holmes does not exist”. As is well known, Millian proposals to deal with these sentences are a dime a dozen. In particular, Yablo is interested in Kripke’s puzzling proposal, according to which, in Nathan Salmon’s reconstruction, “…the sentences involving the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ that were written in creating the fiction express no propositions, about the fictional character or anything else. They are all part of the pretence…” (1998: 294). This means they are props. Therefore, “…the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is ambiguous. In its original use as a name for a human being – its use by Conan Doyle in writing the fiction, and presumably by the reader reading the fiction –...