conceptual

Professor Anderson is having a conversation with his wife, Dr. Marion. He tells her he wants to organise a dinner for a couple of recent graduates, John and Mary. His wife asks him why he wants to do so. He argues that he wants to celebrate their graduation and maybe give them some advice on their future careers that might be of help for their navigating the current job market. Dr. Marion thinks that Profr. Anderson helping recent graduates with professional advice is a great idea and also agrees with him that celebrating the graduation of one’s students is also a good enough reason for organising a dinner. However, she is dissatisfied with Profr. Anderson’s justification. “Ok, but what about Ezekiel? He also just recently graduated and could use some advice as well, right?” Very little has been written about this sort of argumentative exchanges in the specialised literature on argumentation theorem but according to ti, Dr. Marion’s reply commits some kind of tu quoque fallacy (also ...

Contextualist and relativists regarding epistemic modals quarrel on how to account for phenomena like the following: Sally’s mother comes into Sally’s bedroom to find her looking under the bed. “What is going on?” asks Sally’s mother, “why are you looking under the bed?” (1) “My glasses, they might be there,” replies Sally. After taking a long look under he bed, Sally finds no glasses under it. So she moves on to look in other places, but not before saying, (2) “Oops, I was wrong.” What is going on here? According to me, this is just a case of moral luck, but in the context of assertion. According to Andrew Latus (2001): The problem of moral luck traps us between an intuition and a fact: . 1)  the intuition that luck must not make moral differences (e.g., that luck must not affect a person’s moral worth, that luck must not affect what a person is morally responsible for).  . 2)  the fact [Berg-Cross 1975, Cushman et.al. 2009, Cushman 2008, etc.] tha...

Cada vez que se toma un riego, existen por lo menos dos maneras de evaluar el acto: uno, juzgar si estuvo justificado asumir el riesgo (dado el estado de conocimiento del sujeto, la información disponible, las probabilidades, las ganancias posibles de los posibles resultados, etc.) y dos, simplemente juzgar si el resultado fue el deseado. Arriesgar todo nuestro patrimonio en una carrera de caballos de cuyos participantes no sabemos nada es insensato, aun cuando ganemos la puesta y la riqueza que obtengamos de la misma nos traiga enormes beneficios. Inversamente, hay un sentido en el que, aún cuando estamos justificados en tomar un riesgo, post facto sentimos que estuvo mal tomarlo si el resultado que obtenemos no es el deseado. Distinguir entre estos dos tipos de juicios es uno de los puntos centrales de Bernard Williams en su seminal artículo “Suerte Moral” (1981). Cada vez que tomamos el volante de un auto, estamos corriendo el riesgo de atropellar a alguien. Si somos cuidadosos ...

It does not matter if it is the end of a relationship, a friendship or a love-dream. It does not make a difference if it is saying good-bye to a friend, a lover or a husband. In every case, it is always hard to let go. And it is hard to let go, because it is hard to let go of everything . When we are left without the person, the relationship, whatever, we are still left with a lot of baggage, mostly, with a lot of questions. That is what we have to let go of. That is what closure means. To turn an ending into a closure is to get rid of the questions and doubts that remain. [Of course, this is not the only reason why endings are difficult. There is, first of all, loss and mourning , not to mention disbelief (This is not happening! This is not the end. We can still make it, etc.) Also, nostalgia , in the sense of a feeling of wishing that things went back to an idealized past when things were either working or still full of promise. There is even a feeling of relief mixed up with al...

There are almost as many kinds of nominalisms as there are ontological (and semantic categories). There are nominalists of inobservable entities and nominalists regarding mathematical objects; my concern here is with nominalists regarding fictional characters, that is, philosophers who think fictional characters do not exist tout court . They do not subsist or inexist or otherwise occur within our ontology. Thus, this nominalism faces similar problems as other sorts of nominalisms. In particular, I think the basic issue plaguing nominalisms today is that language use is not so neatly divided in discrete domains of discourse. Mathematical nominalists, for example, have strong problems when trying to account for mathematical application and, in general, the way mathematical vocabulary is so deeply interwoven into non-mathematical areas. A nominalism for fictional name faces a similar problem of accounting for the use of fictional empty names outside fiction. The nominalist about fiction...

In a previous blog post I argued that when we expect people of certain groups to behave a certain way (the way that fits our stereotype of the group they belong to) but also to not behave that way (because we disapprove of it), we condemn people from these groups to unavoidable disapproval: if their behaviour fits the stereotype, their behaviour is devaluated by disapproval because the traits that conform the stereotype are devaluated, but if their behaviour challenges the stereotype, then it is also disapproved of precisely for not conforming to social expectations. One might respond to my diagnosis by arguing one of two things. First, that the paradox emerges from an equivocation in the term “expectation”. Second, that there is a symmetry at the heart of the paradox that would allow us to derive the opposite conclusion: that there is a positive double bind such that whatever people from these marginalised groups do we cannot but get social approval for our actions. I will address...

I am interested in the intersection between two phenomena that are common and contribute to the marginalisation of whole groups of people (because of their gender, race, class, etc.). Each one of them itself contributes to this sort of marginalisation, no doubt, but their interaction generates new challenges to the understanding of the phenomenon of marginalisation. The first one is stereotyping and the second one is disapproval. I call “stereotyping” the phenomenon of expecting people belonging to a certain group to exhibit certain traits and not others, like expecting women to behave in feminine ways, men to be masculine, native people to be spiritual and in touch with the earth, good looking people to be dumb and shallow, etc. I call “disapproval” the phenomenon of approving of or otherwise valuing, without justification, certain human traits while disapproving of or devaluating others. When we value rationality over intuition or intelligence over strength, we engage in this sort of...