conceptual

One of the basic problem of grounding  theory originates from an assumed fundamental asymmetry between the ultimate explanans and explananda of metaphysical explanation. While explananda can be composed of other facts in several ways, by disjunction, negation, conjunction, quantification, etc., the fundamental facts that constitute the explanans are supposed to be simple in themselves and total explanans can only be composed in of these simple facts in a straightforward aggregative way. In other words, while we need to find a metaphysical explanation to disjunctive, negative, quantified truth-bearers, etc., Neo-Aristotelian metaphysics resists the acceptance of fundamental negative, disjunctive or quantified facts. Thus, it faces the significant challenge of having to find adequate non-disjunctive grounds for disjunctive facts, positive grounds for negative facts, non-quantified grounds for quantified fact, non-modal grounds for modal facts, etc. So far, this task had proved elusiv...

In Euclid, parallelism is defined negatively by the absence of an intersection. But, even if they are not explicitly mentioned in this definition, the phenomenon of parallelism is ultimately about angles, because line intersection is also ultimately about angles (in particular, about the angle thus determined) – this is common sense, I think –; thus, in the end, parallelism is not about the angle between the parallel lines themselves (which does not exist) but about the angles produced by other, non-parallel, lines (otherwise, as I just mentioned, there would be no angles). In this context, we can think of axiom SAS as an extreme, simpler case of how to answer a more general question: how are angles are parallels related?  The other extreme is to say that they are completely independent, which is what José Gil is currently exploring. But there is an ample space between one extreme and the other. Remember that, according to SAS, if two straight lines (well, to be historically accura...

Plato on False Judgment in the  Theaetetus Axel Barceló-Aspeitia  ,  Edgar González-Varela Journal of the History of Philosophy Johns Hopkins University Press Volume 61, Number 3, July 2023 pp. 349-372 10.1353/hph.2023.a902875 Abstract Under what conditions would it be paradoxical to consider the possibility of false judgment? Here we claim that in the initial puzzle of  Theaetetus  187e5–188c9, where Plato investigates the question of what could psychologically cause a false judgment, the paradoxical nature of this question derives from certain constraints and restrictions about causal explanation, in particular, from the metaphysical principle that opposites cannot cause opposites. Contrary to all previous interpretations, this metaphysical approach does not attribute to Plato any controversial epistemological assumptions and fits better with the text and its role within the dialectic of the dialogue.

  Factores que pueden justificar la adopción y mantenimiento de una creencia: Evidenciales Directa Empírica Por intuición racional Indirecta ¿Puede ser inferida de manera adecuado de otras creencias sobre el mismo tema? ¿Quién mas (qué otros agentes individuales y colectivos) creen y/o afirman lo mismo o lo contrario y en qué circunstancias? Lo que está en juego: Efectos que tendría la adopción de la creencia En el agente (individual o colectivo) que la adopta y en los demás Materialmente o en su auto-percepción Independientemente de que sea verdadera o no Si acertáramos y fuera verdadera Si nos equivocáramos y no fuera verdadera

 Hace unos días en el desayuno, mi novia y yo nos topamos con esta paradoja que, por lo menos yo, no había visto en otro lado. Parte de cuatro premisas que me parecen poco controversiales: Los objetos del conocimiento proposicional son proposiciones [Primera Premisa] Para saber de manera singular (es decir, de manera directa, no descriptiva) de un objeto  a  que es F,  es necesario conocer a a . (Como Platón ya argumentaba en el Teeteto ) [Segunda Premisa] El conocimiento es fáctico: solo se pueden conocer proposiciones verdaderas. [Tercera Premisa] El escepticismo es falso: existe por lo menos un sujeto epistémico S  y una proposición p  tal que S  sabe que p. [Cuarta Premisa] Por un poco de reflexión, S  puede llegar a saber de no- p  que es falsa [de 4 y un poco de lógica]. S  conoce a no -p  [de 5 y 2] no- p  es verdadera [de 6, 3 y 1] p  es verdadera [de 3 y 4] p  y no- p son ambas verdaderas. [Contradicción] ¿Al...

I take this to be a fundamental logical principle of rationality: that whatever you are already committed to believing restricts what else you can believe (without revising what you are already committed to believing). This is enough to derive some version of the principle of non-contradiction, all that is required is recognizing that this relation be recognized as being none other but what we call “negation”. The basis motivation behind the main and only premise of this argument is that rationality has to do not only with what one ought to believe or not ex nihilo , but what one ought to believe or not given what we already do believe or not. This basic principle can be decomposed in four different principles: What one believes restricts what one can believe or not What one believes restricts what one ought to believe or not What one does not believe restricts what one can believe or not What one does not believe restricts what one ought to believe or not Let us focus on the first on...